Friday, April 1, 2011

How can anything good come out of the no-fly zone?

Is enforcement of no-fly zone a good idea?

I have been struggling with this question since the suggestion was put out starting late February 2011. I have been reluctant to take a firm stance on either side. But I have mostly been leaning towards disagreeing with military intervention, be it just a no-fly zone or a full on attack on Qaddafi with ground troops. As time passes and the complexities of the situation become clearer, my leaning is looking more like a conviction.

I understand the alternatives to military intervention were and are very limited. One was to let the rebellion continue on its organic path, knowing that there is a significant chance that Qaddafi would crush the rebellion. But if they would win, it would have been an inside job. The other alternative, that Obama and all other proponents of no-fly zone are conveniently ignoring, was to strictly enforce arms and oil embargo on Qaddafi and his regime. The Security Council could instead of authorizing a no-fly zone, authorize the deployment of naval and ground troops to the boarders of Libya. With potentially less resources than what NATO is putting into their current operation, all the major transit routes (water and land) in and out of Libya could be closed and monitored by international forces to block: 1. the supply of arms to the Qaddafi regime, and 2. export of lucrative oil by his regime. This would guarantee that very soon his fighting resources would dry up. I firmly believe that if it was not for the oil that Qaddafi has been selling (either in the form of futures or actual barrels), which provides a flow of money for his arms purchases, he would not have survived the expensive war he is waging on its population.

Now I would like to ask the proponents of the no-fly zone, how they envisage anything good coming out of the different scenarios unfolding in Libya at the moment. Please see below for just two of the unsolvable puzzles that the international forces have to deal with now:

1. While the NATO has been beating on Qaddafi forces for close to two weeks under the mandate of the UN Security Council Resolution 1973, they have not been able to ensure much military victory for the rebel groups. Now the big three behind this military intervention, France, Britain and the US are contemplating other forms of support to the rebels including supply of arms.

Mind you that this is a rebel movement with an unclear structure with rather unknown leadership. Who knows which rebel leader would rise from the ashes of others once the dust settles and what his ambitions and motives would be. As Patrick Cockburn puts it, “the local leaders who rise to the top in these circumstances are usually those who speak the best English and get on with the US and its allies.”

If NATO does not arm the rebels, chances that Qaddafi loyalist forces would crush them is significant. A defeat of the rebellion will not only embolden other tyrants to use force against any dissent, but also further discredits NATO and the United Nation’s Security Council. If they do arm the rebel groups, there is a good chance that another Afghanistan type authoritarian rule (either Islamic or secular) could arise in the years ahead. Imagine Taliban with a massive oil wealth! Who would want that?

Robert Gates, the US Defense Secretary, told Congress on Thursday, March 31, that he opposed the US arming the rebels because of the “unknowns.” He, however, “suggested that the administration had no problem with other countries sending weapons to help the rebels.” Gates knows how things turned out in Afghanistan with American arms and money. I suspect that Robert Gates doesn’t care about what happened to the people of Afghanistan who paid the price by living under Taliban first and then under foreign occupation. But he cares about U.S.’s face.

2. The SC Resolution 1973 “authorized Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, to take all necessary measures to protect civilians under threat of attack in the country.” So the central concern of this mandate is the civilian lives. Now, I highly doubt that anyone within the UN SC would exclude from the civilian status the unarmed population who either support Qaddafi or are unfortunate enough to be trapped in a government-controlled city. And it should not come as surprise for anyone that Qaddafi forces would use civilians to their advantage in any possible form and shape. There are reports that Qaddafi royalists are “supplying assault rifles to civilians in the town of Surt” while in other contexts using the civilian population “to deter NATO from striking.”

Did NATO commanders really not know how hard it is to tell civilians from combatants in an urban-combat setting? And if NATO can’t be sure who is a civilian and who is a combatant, how would the weakly trained and commanded rebels make such distinction?

Now get this: while supporting them to take over more Libyan cities from Qaddafi forces, “the coalition has told the rebels that the fog of war will not shield them from possible bombardment by NATO planes and missiles,” if they (knowingly or unknowingly) target civilians. Does NATO really mean this or are they covering their back by just saying it. If they mean it, they have a serious problem on their hands as they will soon have to bomb the rebels. There is no doubt in my mind that civilian casualty will be significant in the rebel groups’ march towards any urban center. If they don’t mean it, however, they are in violation of their mandate.

In conclusion, there are two bad options left for the West:

1. Choke off Qaddafi forces by blocking all arms and oil deals linked to his regime. (Something that the West should have done instead of sending planes and bombers).

2. Engages in a full blown confrontation with the Qaddafi forces. Despite the claims by commanders and politicians that NATO will not fight the rebels’ fight for them, they are doing it and will likely increase their role as a party to this conflict. I am in no way a proponent of such a role for any foreign force, but I don’t see any other way out of this. Now that they have gone in, they have further polarized the conflict and exposed the public to potential violence more than before. This means that if the Qaddafi forces get a chance, they will not show any restraint (if they have any) in killing and maiming those who sided with the “foreign enemy,” civilians and combatants alike.

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